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if the pseudoscientificus aspect were never mentioned or expounded dur-
ing the trial.
It is also apparent that the possibility of admission would be in-
creased if narcoanalysis were included in a long term examination as
opposed to one or two brief interviews. This would afford the expert
other data on which to base his opinion, thus constructing a sounder
foundation and diverting the spot-light which now seems to be focused
on the reliability of truth drugs. 20
In conclusion, narcoanalysis seems to be generally recognized by the
courts and favored by legal writers when utilized in cases of insanity.
There is conflict, however, in relation to milder mental conditions. Some
courts seem to be willing to extend the use of such drugs into the area
of credibility and character evidence both of the accused and of the
witness; while others, as indicated, are not so willing. In addition, local
rules pertaining to exclusion of evidence will continue to be an im-
portant variant in regard to the use and acceptance of narcoanalysis, in
that such rules will encourage greater court discretion.
J. N. GOLDIN1G.
Guardian and Ward-Dissent by an Incompetent Widow Through
Her Guardian
The guardian of an incompetent widow has many problems, a few
of which may best be pointed out in a hypothetical situation. As-
sume a seventy-year old incompetent widow has a personal estate of
$100,000.00. The husband left no children or collateral heirs. His
estate, valued at $500,000.00, is predominantly personalty such as stock
in his family corporation. Under his will the widow is to receive the
income from one fourth of this estate for life. The residue of the estate
is devised to what had been the widow's favorite charity before she
became incompetent. She did not make a will while she was competent.
She has a brother living who has not seen her for 10 years. What
should the widow's guardian do in regard to the will-should he dis-
sent for her, or should he elect for her to take under the will? What
standard should govern him in making this deicsion? As her brothhr
will be her heir upon her death,' how can the guardian be sure that he
has protected himself against suit by the brother since upon her death
intestate the brother would have an interest sufficient to sue?2
"State v. Sinnott, 43 N. J. Super. 1, 127 A. 2d 424 (1956); STANSBURY,
EVMENCE § 136 (1946).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1, Rule 5 (1950).
- N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-57 (1953). The amount that the brother would receive
upon his sister's death would very possibly bear a direct relationship to the amount
which the widow received from her husband's estate.
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Prior to 1849 a widow in North Carolina was required to dissent
from her husband's will in person and this could not be done for her by
an attorney or, if she had one, by her guardian.3 If she was a lunatic,
no dissent could be made. In that year a statute was passed to allow
the guardian of an incompetent widow to dissent for her.4  Were the
widow competent, she could elect to take under the will or to dissent
for numerous and unknown personal reasons without having to answer
to anyone for her decision. The exercise of the right by the guardian
to dissent for the incompetent should be subject to discretionary stand-
ards, but quaere as to the standard to be applied? The statute is silent
on this point.
Two tests have been evolved elsewhere to determine when the right of
election should be exercised for an incompetent widow.5 The first is based
solely on the monetary benefit to the widow. If under a dissent she
would be entitled to a larger share than she would get under the will,
then the guardian must dissent.6 The second test repudiates the mone-
tary benefit as the sole test, and considers it only as one of the many
broad factors to be taken into account in reaching the decision.7
It seems to be a settled proposition in North Carolina that a guardian
must make certain that he receives from the administrator of an estate
the full share to which his ward is entitled." In managing his ward's
estate a guardian must act in good faith and with the care and judg-
ment that a man of ordinary prudence exercises in his own affairs.9 The
general rule is that in determining whether election by the guardian
should be for or against the will, financial benefit should be considered
as a strong, but not conclusive, reason for electing to renounce.10 No
cases have been found which state the North Carolina view on this
point.
In a 1953 Oklahoma case," the testator left his eighty-four year old
Lewis v. Lewis, 29 N. C. 72 (1846) ; Hinton v. Hinton, 28 N. C. 274 (1846).
See Bell v. Wilson, 41 N. C. 1 (1849).
'This provision may now be found in N. C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (1950).
'See 39 VA. L. REv. 717 (1953).
' Wentworth v. Waldron, 86 N. H. 559, 172 Atl. 247 (1934) ; Matter of Hills,
157 Misc. 109, 283 N. Y. Supp. 733 (Sup. Ct. 1936) ; German's Case, 318 Pa. 200,
178 At. 38 (1935).
'Estate of Kees, 39 Iowa 287, 31 N. W. 2d 380 (1948) ; Hogan v. Roche, 95
N. H. 368, 63 A. 2d 794 (1949) ; Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Dais, 122 N. J. Eq. 182,
192 Atl. 849 (1937) ; Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Haynes, 180 Tenn. 247, 174 S. W. 2d
39 (1943).
' Alexander v. Alexander, 120 N. C. 472, 27 S. E. 121 (1897) ; Culp v. Lee, 109
N. C. 675, 14 S. E. 74 (1891). -See LAKE, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE METHODS
§ 523 (1952).
° N. C. GEN. STAT. § 33-20 (1950) ; Luton v. Wilcox, 83 N. C. 21 (1880).
10 In re Connor, 254 Mo. 65, 162 S. W. 252 (1914) ; Van Steenwyck v. Wash-
burn, 59 Wis. 483, 17 N. W. 289 (1883). See 74 A. L. R. 464; 147 A. L. R. 349:
57 Am. Jua., Wills § 1528. See also ATKINSON, WILLS § 138 (2d ed. 1953); 4
PAGE ON WILLS, § 1363 (Lifetime edition).
" Turner v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 262 P. 2d 897 (Okla. 1953).
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incompetent widow one half of his estate of approximately $600,000.00.
Her personal estate was valued at about the same amount. Since the
testator left no children, parents, brothers, or sisters, his widow would
have been entitled to the whole estate in case of intestacy under the
Oklahoma law. 12  For that reason the incompetent widow's guardian
filed a dissent to the will. The county court, however, ruled that the
widow should take under the will instead of by intestacy. Upon the
guardian's appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court said:
"We cannot agree with the argument that the election of the
court that Mrs. Turner take under the will is illegal in that it
gives her less than she would take under the law. If, when the
surviving spouse is unable to elect, the court must elect for the
incompetent survivor solely upon the basis of which election
would render greater material value, then the matter of election
would be merely a question of mathematics, a task for appraisers
and accountants. The word 'Election' means the right and power
to choose without restrictions."' 3
An earlier case in Florida1 4 had reached the same result. Although
the guardian had flied a dissent for his ward, an incompetent widow, the
Florida Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that the
widow take the income from $400,000.00 for life as provided under her
husband's will. Her share under the intestacy laws amounted to
$2,000,000.00. In reaching this decision the court said:
'In determining what is for the best interest of the afflicted
widow, the chancellor will generally be influenced by these con-
siderations: (1) The husband's right to dispose of his estate is
limited by the right given the widow to renounce the provisions
of the will in her behalf and take under the statute but the sole
reason in law for giving the widow the right to renounce is to
insure ample provision for her personal needs and comforts. (2)
Her personal needs and comforts may not be confined to pure
84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 (1951).
"Turner v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 262 P. 2d 897, 903 (Okla. 1953).
1" First Nat'l Bank v. McDonald, 100 Fla. 675, 130 So. 596 (1930). In rejecting
the monetary test, the court said: "An insane widow or one acting for her does not
come into a court of equity for the purpose of renouncing her husband's will on like
terms and in the same legal status as if she were sane. As to the sane widow we
have shown that the act of renunciation is personal, absolute, and incontestible.
The same right might be exercised by her guardian for her if specifically directed
by statute; but our statute not having so directed she is left to her remedy
in a court of equity. When made by a court of equity election is no longer personal
and voluntary but must be predicated on some ground of equity shown to exist in
favor of the widow, and of which she is deprived by the will. In determining
whether such equity exists the chancellor will be guided by what is to the best
interest of the afflicted widow." Id. at 681, 130 So. at 598.
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monetary considerations. (3) The matter of enriching the
widow's estate and passing something to her kinspeople has no
place in the chancellor's consideration. (4) The kinspeople of the
wife have no claim direct or indirect on the estate of the husband.
(5) The fact that a permanently insane widow knows nothing of
the value of money, cannot use it with discretion, and has no need
for money nor property save to furnish ample comforts and needs
may be considered. (6) It may also be borne in mind that when
the husband has made ample provision for his insane wife he has
an inherent right to dispose of his property as he pleases, pro-
vided the disposition will not be contrary to public policy. Other
considerations will no doubt arise from time to time."'15
A Virgiina case'16 gives an interesting twist to this problem. There
also the incompetent widow would have taken less under the will than
under the law of intestacy. The devisees and legatees, however, made
a compromise with the widow's guardian which increased the widow's
share, although it was still smaller than her intestate share. The lower
court approved the compromise, but upon appeal the Virginia Supreme
Court said that the widow's guardian could either accept or dissent, but
that it would be beyond the power of the court to sanction a compromise.
The lack of a standard17 other than perhaps the monetary one
greatly hinders the effective use of estate planning in North Carolina by
a man who is married to an incompetent. He must leave her at least
her intestate share of his estate or else her guardian will probably be
compelled to dissent for her. Upon her death this estate will go to her
heirs-who might well not be the persons the husband would desire to
inherit any of his estate. This is particularly burdensome to a husband
whose main assets are personalty, such as stock in a family corporation.
If the incompetent has a separate estate of any great size, the inclusion
in her estate of the share received from her husband will greatly in-
crease the taxes to be paid.18
Perhaps the safest way for the guardian to protect himself would be
for him to bring an action seeking the advice of the court.19 In such
5 Id. at 681, 130 So. at 598.1 First Nat'l Exchange Bank v. Hughson, 194 Va. 736, 74 S. E. 2d 797 (1953).
" AxINSON, WILLS § 138 (2d ed. 1953) suggests three possible ways for making
the election: (1) have a judicial hearing to approve the guardian's determination;(2) have an independent decision of the court; or (3) refer the entire matter to a
master for investigation and report.
"s Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2001 and § 1. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 105-4, § 105-5,
§ 105-6 (1950).
20 Johnson v. Wagner, 219 N. C. 235, 13 S. E. 2d 419 (1941) ; In re Reynolds'
Guardianship, 206 N. C. 276, 173 S. E. 789 (1934) ; Commercial National Bank v.
Alexander, 188 N. C. 667, 125 S. E. 385 (1924). See MINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA
PRAcricE AND PROCEDURz § 168 2d ed. 1956). See also footnote 17, supra.
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action the heirs apparent of the widow should be parties. Any decision
given would then become res adjudicata as to the parties.20
HENRY M. WHITESDES.
International Law-The High Seas, The Continental Shelf, and Free
Navigation
Few principles of International Law have been more fully recognized
and accepted than free navigation on the high seas ! Professor Colombos
of the Hague Academy of International Law states, "Today it is uni-
versally recognized that the open sea is not susceptible of appropriation
and that no state can obtain such possession of it as would legally be
necessary to give rise to a claim of property. The high sea cannot be
subject to a right of sovereignty for it is the necessary means of com-
munication between nations and its free use thus constitutes an indis-
pensable element for international trade and navigation."'
I
Though the seas are free today, this was not always so, nor were they
set free without a struggle. From the tenth to the sixteenth century,
English kings made sovereign claims to all seas.2 During the fifteenth
century Pope Alexander, by a Papal Bull of September 25, 1493, par-
titioned the Atlantic Ocean between Portugal and Spain. Denmark,
Genoa, Sweden, Russia, and many other states asserted similar claims
of sovereignty over the high seas. This tide of sovereign claims, how-
ever, soon receded when Queen Elizabeth proclaimed, "The use of the
sea and air is common to all; neither can any title to the ocean belong
to any people or private persons forasmuch as neither nature nor regard
of the public use and custom permitteth any possession thereof." Twenty-
five years later, in 1609, the Dutch publicist Grotius (Hugo de Groot),
traditionally considered the founder of International Law, stated as a
basic principle, "The open sea cannot be subject to the sovereignty of
any state, access to all nations is open to all, not merely by the per-
mission but by the command of the Law of Nations. ' 3 Justice Story,
in The Marianna Flora,4 stated the American view---" . . . [U]pon the
20 In re Morris, 224 N. C. 487, 31 S. E. 2d 539 (1944) ; Cameron v. McDonald,
216 N. C. 712, 6 S. E. 2d 497 (1940) ; Ludwick v. Penny, 158 N. C. 104, 73 S. E.
228 (1910).
* HIcGINS & COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA § 50 (3d ed. 1954).
2 For a historical outline of these British claims, see FULTON, THE SoVrR-
EIGNTY OF THE SEA (1911).
'GRorius, MARE LiBuEm (1609), contained in c. 12 of GROTIUS, DE JURE
PRAFDAE (CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Scott Trans., 1950).
'24 U. S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1826). To the effect that "International Law is
a part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice . . . ," see Justice Gray's opinion in The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677
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